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T
he Indo-Pacific, as a geographic concept that connects the vast oceans of the Pacific 
and the Indian along with the states in between, is not a new idea. Indeed, the idea of 
a broader geographic region―rather than more traditional subsets such as East Asia, 
South Asia, or the more expansive Asia-Pacific―has been used for more than a decade 
by scholars and practitioners in the region. An Indian naval captain began using the concept in 
geopolitical terms more than a decade ago, but the terminology has not been limited to scholars 
in Delhi. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, back during his first stint as Prime Minister in 2007, 
spoke to India’s parliament about his country’s vision for the Indo-Pacific noting a “confluence 
of the two seas”1 and pressed for a need to transcend beyond traditional frameworks that often 
separated or minimized the geopolitical connections between South Asian and the Indian Ocean 
1  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Confluence of the Two Seas: Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, 
Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” August 2007.
 https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html
Abstract
The governments of Japan and the United States have firmly adopted the notion of a “Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) at the heart of their regional foreign policies.  The FOIP 
initiative has now energized other regional allies and partners of these two leading states 
as they search for ways to respond to and contribute to the FOIP.  As self-styled “middle 
powers,” Canada and Australia have been no exception.  This article explores the potential 
roles to be played by Ottawa and Canberra, both individually, and in tandem, with regards to 
matters such as respect for national sovereignty, peaceful conflict resolution, free and open 
trading practices, and the maintenance of international laws and norms.  The article reveals 
that while both Canada and Australia both effectively support the FOIP, Canberra has been 
more proactive in turning its rhetoric into actions by means of a dedicated “Step Up” policy 
in the crucial South Pacific sub-region, as well as noteworthy efforts to enhance its own 
capabilities in line with American alliance expectations.  It concludes that Washington’s need 
for capable and willing allies will grow further, and that both countries are well-positioned 
to contribute further to the FOIP in multifarious ways, both as allies, and potentially as in a 
bilateral capacity, should the opportunity arise.
*  This article is based off a range of discussions, meetings and presentations that the authors had 
during an academic outreach trip to California in May 2019. The authors engaged with a number of 
scholars, officials and policy makers on the Indo-Pacific and the role of middle powers, such as Canada 
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Korean Consulate in Los Angeles, the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles, the Middlebury Institute of 
International Studies at Monterey, the Japan Society of Northern California and Stanford University. 
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region with that of East Asia and the Pacific.  
But, while not new, the Indo-Pacific framing has been quickly gaining currency by actors 
in the region, with Japan and the United States declaring Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 
strategies or visions, in addition to other regional approaches by India, Australia and Indonesia. 
According to Washington, in a recent Report released by the Department of Defense (DOD), 
the FOIP is based upon the principles of (i) respect for sovereign independence, (ii) peaceful 
resolution of disputes, (iii) free, fair and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent 
agreements, and connectivity, and (iv) adherence to international rules and norms, (including 
those of freedom of navigation and overflight).2
The United States emphasized the importance of this change by renaming its former US 
Pacific Command―military headquarters for the region based in Hawaii―to the US Indo-Pacific 
Command last year.3 The concept has also sparked interest of like-minded states in Europe― 
both France and the United Kingdom demonstrating a keen interest in promoting their own 
engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Earlier this year, the French aircraft carrier―the Charles de 
Gaulle―set course for its journey from the Mediterranean Sea to Singapore, traversing through 
the Indian Ocean region and working with regional partners on its way. The British have also 
made similar deployments in recent years. Last year, the Royal Navy dispatched three ships that 
traversed the South China Sea alongside a contingent from France’s navy. During the trip, the 
UK vessels conducted a freedom of navigation patrol in the waters near the Paracel Islands in the 
disputed South China Sea.4 
To be sure, the Indo-Pacific is facing a host of shared security challenges, from maritime 
piracy and crime, to heated territorial disputes and a pressing need to enhance regional capacity 
and readiness for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to mitigate the impact of natural 
disasters. In the vast maritime space of the region―stretching from East Africa to the Pacific 
island chains―the foundations of regional commerce and security are secured through the 
freedom of navigation and secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). These areas are crucial 
for all states in the region―including middle powers such as Canada and Australia―as they 
are both deeply invested in secure supply chains through its economic integration with the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
There is great economic opportunity in the region for both Canada and Australia with large 
economies and diverse fast-paced growth in many middle-size economies. That said, alongside 
this economic growth is a large demand for infrastructure development in the region―with the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimating that there is a need for more than $25 trillion in 
infrastructure by 2030.5 To fill this void, several regional powers have the ability to work with 
states in the region for a sustainable way forward based on fair-lending, transparent institutions 
and long-term growth. This is an area that middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, can 
join other states―such as the US, Japan, and states from Europe―to push forward on and make 
unique contributions. 
2  US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a 
Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/
DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF
3  US Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony,” May 
2018. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1535776/us-indo-pacific-
command-holds-change-of-command-ceremony/
4  Tim Kelly, “British Navy warship sails near South China Sea islands, angering Beijing,” Reuters, 
September 6, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-china-southchinasea-exclusive/
exclusive-british-navy-warship-sails-near-south-china-sea-islands-angering-beijing-idUSKCN1LM017
5  Asian Development Bank, “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs,” February 2017. https://www.adb.
org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs
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Yet, alongside these economic opportunities are a number of key challenges to the rules and 
order in the region that have underpinned security and prosperity for the littoral states. China 
continues to favour coercive actions rather than adherence to international law with regard to its 
salami-slicing tactics in the South China and East China Seas.6 These concerns in the maritime 
realm are not limited to the East and South China Seas. In the Indian Ocean region, there has 
been a build-up of Chinese infrastructure development in critical areas such as deep ports in Sri 
Lanka and Pakistan. These moves continue to draw anxiety from states in the region, who are 
wary of China’s long-term geopolitical motivations through its signature Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI).
Canada’s Approach to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Canada has shown an interest in being more engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. During the visit 
of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Ottawa in late April, Canadian Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau noted a “shared vision for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on the 
rule of law.”7 The statement was Canada’s first high-level endorsement of the importance of Indo-
Pacific strategies, of which many key regional players like the US, Japan, Australia, India and 
Indonesia have already adopted. But, while the visit with Japan was the first upfront embrace 
of the Indo-Pacific concept, Ottawa has in fact already outlined its shared views on the region 
through its joint statement with India last year―where the two sides agreed to “reaffirm the 
importance of lawful commerce and the freedom of navigation and over-flight throughout the 
Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with international law.”8
Despite this, however, Canada has been hesitant to embrace the FOIP concept. The traditional 
lens for Ottawa to look at engagement has been through the Asia-Pacific framing―defining the 
region largely through our experience in the multilateral architecture such as the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the trade side, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Regional Forum on the political-security side. Canada was a founding member of APEC 
in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its formation 
in 1994. Aside from these two main vehicles, Canada has been active in the international 
development space over the years through and is a member of the Asian Development Bank, 
and more recently joined―while not before considerable internal debate―the Chinese-led Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2017.9   
This multilateral underpinning is of course complemented by a range of diverse bilateral 
relations in the region, with dif ferent opportunities and challenges. China and Japan―the 
second and third largest economies―are the two most critical relationships in terms of trade 
value, but there are growing relationships with a host of other partners in the region too―
including South Korea (with which Canada inked a Free Trade Agreement in 2014), Taiwan, 
6  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters 
Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response - Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government 
and Other Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea,” June 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
page23e_000021.html
7  Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister of Canada Announces Closer Cooperation with Japan,” April 
2019. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2019/04/28/prime-minister-canada-announces-closer-collaboration-
japan
8  Prime Minister of Canada, “India-Canada Joint Statement: Partnership for Security and Growth,” 
February 2018. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/02/23/india-canada-joint-statement-partnership-
security-and-growth
9  Philip Calvert, “Canada’s Move to Join the AIIB is Smart Politics and Economics,” Nikkei Asian Review, 
September to 2016. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Philip-Calvert-Canada-s-move-to-join-the-AIIB-is-
smart-politics-and-economics
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India and the individual member states of ASEAN. Underscoring these growing relationships―
at least in economic terms―is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, a mega-regional free trade pact that Canada ratified, along with 10 other states in the 
region, last year.10    
But yet, despite a long history of engagement, the consistency of Canada’s role often appears 
unmoored and not fully aligned with our interests and stakes in the significant geopolitical shifts 
taking place in the region. A frequent critique from stakeholders and officials in the region is 
that Canada must make a more consistent and comprehensive approach that demonstrates an 
investment of time and capital that goes beyond merely trade and investment. Specifically, there 
is a need and desire―at least from most states―for a strong Canadian voice on political-security 
developments in the region, be it on maritime security, nuclear non-proliferation or humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR). This is where the tenets, rules and values that form 
the basis of the emerging growth of Indo-Pacific frameworks will help Canada better serve its 
interests and promote its role.   
The role for Canada in the Indo-Pacific
In June 2019, Canada’s Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan visited the Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore for the fourth consecutive year. The Dialogue, hosted under the stewardship of the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies in the UK, is the premier security and defense summit 
in Asia and has become a “must-attend” event for officials, policy makers and scholars focused 
on the region’s wide range of emerging security issues―of which strategic competition between 
the United States and China is top of mind in recent years. Immediately following the Shangri-La 
Dialogue, Sajjan visited Japan for an important bilateral visit which was hosted by Japan’s Defense 
Minister Takeshi Iwaya. During Sajjan’s visit, Canada and Japan agreed to work cooperatively to 
advance a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”11 Indeed, when thinking about Canada’s engagement in 
the region, our relations with Japan must be first of mind. 
As Canada’s looks to reorient its defense posture to be more active in the Indo-Pacific, Japan 
should be the logical cornerstone of such efforts. During the visit of Sajjan to Tokyo in June, 
Canada and Japan underscored the importance of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
(ACSA) signed last year. This agreement will strengthen cooperation between the Canadian 
Armed Forces (CAF) and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and will allow both countries to make 
efficient use of each other’s military equipment during operations and exercises in Canada, Japan 
and other locations. The agreement will also advance cooperation between the two countries 
in response to humanitarian and disaster crises, peacekeeping initiatives, and allow greater 
collaboration with third-partners, including the US.12
In addition to the ACSA agreement, both sides are moving towards greater interoperability 
between their militaries with a growth in joint exercises and high-level exchanges. In 2017, the 
two sides commenced bilateral naval drills dubbed “Kaedex” (“kaede” meaning maple leaf in 
Japanese) and the Canadian navy also participated as a trilateral participant last year in the US-
10  Global Affairs Canada, “CPTPP Explainer,” June 2019. https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng
11  Department of National Defence of Canada, “Joint Statement of the Ministry of Defense of Japan and 
the Department of National Defence of Canada on Defense Cooperation,” June 2019. https://www.
canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2019/06/joint-statement-of-the-ministry-of-defense-
of-japan-and-the-department-of-national-defence-of-canada-on-defense-cooperation.html
12  Global Af fairs Canada, “Canada and Japan sign Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to 




Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019
The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia
Japan “Keen Sword” naval exercises. Canada has also been working with Japan, and other allies 
in the Five Eyes intelligence network, to help monitor and disrupt attempts by North Korea to 
evade sanctions over its nuclear and missiles programs―through surveillance of ship-to-ship 
transfers in the East China Sea.13 Moreover, in 2018 Canadian General Wayne Eyre was appointed 
as Deputy Commander of the UN Command on the Korean Peninsula―marking the first time a 
non-US general assumed the role.
But there are more steps to go in this nascent security relationship. This past April, during the 
visit of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Ottawa, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made the 
first high-level Canadian endorsement of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”―a vision that is shared 
by other like-minded states, such as the US, Australia and Japan. This vision fundamentally 
rests on the maintenance of a rules-based international order premised on common norms, 
laws and practices, with an aim at reducing the potential for conflict and promoting sustainable 
development. This of course draws a stark contrast to China’s increasingly hostile posture in the 
region, marked by its militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea and its unfair 
and non-transparent lending practices through its Belt and Road Initiative. Not to mention its 
coercive attempts―through the arbitrary detention of two of our citizens and sealing off much of 
the market for our exporters of canola and soybeans―to force Canada to relent on the sensitive 
extradition case of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. Going forward Canada should 
continue to enhance our ties with Japan―a natural partner in the region―and other key middle 
powers such as Australia, states in ASEAN and South Korea, to work closely and pursue our 
interests in the Indo-Pacific.
How can Canada become more involved in the emerging Indo-Pacific framework? First, 
Canada must assertively and unapologetically promote its interests and values in the region― 
most of which align closely to its key partners there such as the US, Japan, Australia, and member 
states in ASEAN. For example, if one closely inspects the FOIP policies by Washington and 
Tokyo, they will find more convergence than divergence with regard to Canadian interests. The 
US strategy stresses the need to “promote transparency, openness, rule of law, and the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedom.”14 Tokyo meanwhile stresses the importance of 
peace and stability in the region through common rules, open investment and the provision 
of international public goods. Most would agree these are rules and norms the Canada also 
subscribes too. A corollary to this is that greater engagement with the Indo-Pacific would help 
us further national areas of excellence desperately need in the region’s approach to preventive 
diplomacy, such as women, peace and security.
Second, Canada can manage both an ef fective and pragmatic relationship with China, 
and simultaneously enhance its engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing may be 
wary of the framing of Indo-Pacific, because of its tense relations with Washington under the 
Trump administration, but it would be incorrect to label the different national approaches as a 
containment strategy aimed at China. Rather than alliance-politics, this is a loose grouping of like-
minded and progressive states that are standing up for a prosperous and stable region that follows 
rules and maintains a sustainable trajectory―not to benefit one, but for the region as a whole. 
This is something Canada should stand up for, and it should not let its recent bilateral difficulties 
with Beijing distract it from the larger strategic dynamics playing out in the region.  
Finally, just as engaging China and the Indo-Pacific framework are not mutually exclusive, so 
are the fundamentals of our existing engagements in the region. Ottawa will continue to be a key 
13  Depar tment of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” June 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/
department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-
neon.html
14  US Department of State, “Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region,” November 2018. https://
www.state.gov/advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/
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part of APEC, the ARF, ADB and other multilateral fora―with ASEAN at the core―but it need 
not pursue this road in isolation from cooperation that makes sense with regional partners and 
allies.
Australia’s Indo-Pacific Vision
The first thing to note with regard to Australia’s approach to the FOIP is the nomenclature 
employed.  Canberra has not officially adopted the moniker “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” like 
its American and Japanese partners to badge its regional strategy, with the cognate term “open, 
inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific” featuring instead in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.15 
Some variations on the term naturally appear in surrounding discourses―“a free, open, inclusive 
and prosperous Indo-Pacific” has been used in joint statements with the US and Japan―but this 
slight distinction does not amount to any tangible difference from the core precepts of the FOIP 
(described in the introduction).  
So, what form does Canberra’s participation in the FOIP take, in the context of a broader 
Australian Indo-Pacific strategy (IPs)? There is no one specific policy document or declaration 
that embodies Australia’s IPs, but rather it is represents a compound of individual and joint 
policies and initiatives which sync with the FOIP concept.  In this short briefing it is useful to 
unpack its ideological, security and economic dimensions, all of which are intertwined.
Behind the Australian “vision” of an “Indo-Pacific Century,” destined to bring regional and 
national prosperity, there are three premises.16  First among these is the “relocation” of Australia’s 
strategic frame of reference to the newly identified “Indo-Pacific” region itself.  The recent 
Defence and Foreign Policy White papers codified a shift in the locus and scope of regional 
interaction to the “Indo-Pacific” as geopolitical construct.  Influential Australian figures had long 
advocated for a refocusing on the Indo-Pacific, aside from the extant “Asia Pacific,” as recognition 
not only of India’s rise to economic and strategic prominence, but as a better reflection of the 
actual region Australia itself inhabits at the intersection of these two great Oceans.17 
Second is the oft-repeated government commitment to a “Rules-based International Order” 
(RBO) which the FOIP strongly advocates.  This has long been an identifiable theme for a 
“middle power” country like Australia, which, based solely upon its own national capabilities, 
cannot afford to engage in a no-holds barred struggle of power politics, but rather seeks a “liberal 
internationalist” posture which emphasizes international norms and institutions, sovereignty, 
rule-of-law, non-coercion and all-round “good international citizenship.”18 The RBO concept has 
become an increasingly prolific mantra in Canberra’s policy declarations as the best method 
to achieve regional stability and prosperity.  Not so implicit in the RBO concept is a resistance 
to Chinese revisionist attempts to expand its strategic space and influence across the region 
in ways viewed as detrimental to the existing order, as evidenced through the BRI, Shanghai 
Cooperation organisation, and AIIB, for example. Instead, Australia alongside its close US and 
Japanese partners seeks to provide an alternative to a future regional order dominated by China 
in contradiction with these liberal internationalist principles.  
Third, participation in FOIP-related activities is grounded in Australia’s deep attachment to 
15  Australian Government, “Overview,” in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), pp. 1–10.
16  Cameron Hill, “Australia in the ’Indo-Pacific’ Century: Rewards, Risks, Relationships,” in Parliamentary 
Library Briefing Book (Canberra ACT: Parliamentary Library, 2013), pp. 144–145.
17  Rory Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 68:4 (2014), pp. 470–483.
18  Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment : Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe 
University Press, 2017).
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American regional primacy. Australia―like Japan and many others―sees its bilateral security 
alliance with the US anchored in the broader “hub-and-spokes” network, and its close Special 
Strategic Partnership with Japan, as the best way to uphold or enforce the RBO and secure the 
Indo-Pacific in accord with its national interests.  In correspondence with the recently released 
American Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which outlines replacement US grand strategy for the 
Pivot, Canberra is seeking deeper partnerships with Japan, India, and key SEA states in a bid to 
uphold the RBO semi-independently and collectively, alongside the central role expected of the 
US.19
Security Considerations for Australia
The primary drivers behind Australia’s interest in the FOIP are security concerns.  While broader 
“Non-Traditional Security” (NTS) issues remain prominent in Australian thinking, for example: 
terrorism, irregular populations movements, climate change, or financial or humanitarian crises, 
it is the newly arrived era of great power competition that most vexes strategic planners in 
Canberra.  Based upon its growing economic and strategic weight in the region, China has moved 
from “biding its time and hiding its capabilities” to a newfound policy of “assertiveness” pushing 
out its strategic space and regional influence by a variety of means that have set alarm bells 
ringing in Canberra as portents of a “new Cold War.”  
Chinese militarisation of the contested South China Sea (in violation of international law and 
prior agreements with the US), the use of economic coercion against Canada, Japan and South 
Korea, among others, and its attempts to establish a regional foothold in Australia’s “patch” of 
the South Pacific have shifted perceptions in Canberra.  But in addition to these demonstrations 
of Chinese “sharp power,” nothing so upset the political equilibrium in Canberra as much as 
the recent revelation of the extent of Chinese espionage and “influence operations” discovered 
inside Australia itself.20  On this basis, Australia has tightened its security measures and readily 
complied with US wishes to ban the Chinese state-owned telecom giant Huawei from providing its 
5G network, drawing economic retaliation―an interruption in coal imports―from Beijing.
Indeed, the Chinese challenge is seen across the Indo-Pacific region, and which the FOIP 
concept seeks to address.  It includes the use of economic statecraft to achieve strategic gains as 
well as “hybrid” techniques to challenge the strategic situation on the ground―or more appositely
―on the sea.  By seeking to exploit “gray zone areas” in the maritime space, for example the 
use of fishing fleets and maritime militias to harass competitor states in disputed territories in 
the South China and East China Seas, Beijing is seeking to break out of the confines of its so-
called series of “island chains” and ultimately extend a degree of control over key maritime 
trade arteries. The security of these SLOCS, and the rights of free navigation and overflight 
in international waters are increasingly challenged by naval and air intrusions, and patrols 
attempting to assert Chinese sovereignty.  The controversial Freedom of Navigation Operations 
(FONOPS) conducted by the US Navy consistently meet harassment from Chinese forces.  This 
strikes at the heart of the FOIP and RBO concepts that Australia seeks to defend and exemplify 
Chinese attempts to revise the regional order to its preference.  Australia has sought to augment 
its regional naval presence through Indo-Pacific Endeavour―a task force engaging in a series of 
engagement activities and military training exercises during port visits―in addition to low profile 
maritime patrol and surveillance activities Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and South China Sea 
under Operation Gateway. 
19  US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a 
Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/
DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF
20  John Garnaut, “Australia’s China Reset,” The Monthly, August 2018.
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Australia is also backing the FOIP with hard power through a sustained program to improve 
its defence capabilities with a projected defence budget increase of 2% of GDP, (currently AUD 
$36.4bill. for 2018).21 It is seeking to augment existing capabilities, which are being ever-more 
attuned to combined operations with the US (and potentially Japan) and acquiring new ones. 
Chief among these is the future submarine project which will double the its flotilla by 2030, 
giving it some of the most potent undersea naval capabilities.  In addition, it seeks to increase its 
reconnaissance capabilities to enforce Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the vast Oceanic 
spaces to the north of the Australian continent through acquisition of US hardware such as the 
8A Poseidon maritime surveillance/response aircraft and MQ-4C Triton UAV.
Australia is also upgrading its 70-year-old defence alliance with the US.22 Under the US 
Force Posture Initiatives in Northern Australia, agreement has been made as early as 2016 to 
station a US Marine Task Force in Darwin, while defence, intelligence and military ties have 
all been strengthened.  The 2018 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 
consultations listed a prolific range of areas for cooperation including upholding the rules-based 
international order (through the FOIP), coordination against foreign domestic interference, 
regional maritime capacity-building, economic and infrastructure support, space, cyber and 
energy security issues, missile defence, counter terrorism, and a stronger role for the Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with Japan.23 
Plans have also been unveiled to establish a joint naval base with the US at Lombrum on 
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG).24 As the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper affirms―
“Our alliance with the United States is central to Australia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.”25 And 
additionally, Australia has sought to keep advancing its security relations with Japan through 
its decade-old Strategic Partnership with Tokyo, another advocate of FOIP and the RBO.26 This 
process is unified with the US through means of the reinvigorated Trilateral Strategic Dialogue 
process just mentioned. 
Furthermore, Australia is seeking to extend this into a Quadrilateral process―the “Quad”― 
with New Delhi in order to gain India’s adherence to the overall FOIP vision as part of its Indo-
centric strategy.  However, much confusion reigns as to the exact relationship between the Quad 
and the FOIP that has hindered the understanding of both (as I have illustrated elsewhere), but 
in particular it seems that Quad members are divided over their interpretation of how “inclusive” 
the latter is to be presented.27  Whilst, all parties have stressed that FOIP is open to all that abide 
by its principles, in reality it is a values-loaded concept―perhaps with the intent of “socialising” 
China (in echoes of the earlier “responsible stakeholder” notion).  Indeed, since the Quad 
partners are all democratic states, and the FOIP itself inherently represents an alternative to the 
21  Australian Government, Department of Defence, “A Safer Australia - Budget 2018–19 Defence 
Overview,” May 8, 2018. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au [Accessed March 3, 2019]
22  Thomas Wilkins, “Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-Alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump,” 
Security Challenges [Forthcoming].
23  Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “2018 Australia-U.S. Ministerial 
Consultations (AUSMIN),” July 24, 2018. https://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/2018-ausmin.aspx 
[Accessed March 1, 2019]
24  Joanne Wallis, “Australia Steps Up Its Pacific Pivot,” East Asia Forum, October 20, 2018. http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/20/australia-steps-up-its-pacific-pivot
25  Australian Government, “Overview,” in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 4.
26  Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan Facing ’Disruptive’ Challenges to the Rules Based Order in the 
Indo-Pacific,” Policy Brief, September 26, 2018.
27  Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and the ’Indo Pacific’ Concept―Disambiguating the ’Idea’ and the ’Region’ 
from Quadrilateral ’Strategy’,” Policy Brief, July 19, 2018.
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Chinese-led regional order, there is a large contradiction in this proposition.
Lastly, Australia has been keen to attract additional adherents to the broad FOIP vision, both 
through other enhanced security partnerships, such as with Singapore, but also through the 
“Quad-plus” process that brings extra-regional powers such as France and the UK into the FOIP 
enterprise (noted in the introduction).  The final layer of this cooperation is the desire to maintain 
a place for ASEAN in the FOIP vision―Canberra has been quick to reassure members that 
“ASEAN centrality” will not be undermined, but polls among South East Asia experts indicate 
a great degree of scepticism over the FOIP.28  Indonesia, Australia’s emerging neighbour to the 
north has made attempts to frame its own IPs (the “global maritime fulcrum”), but appears tepid 
towards the FOIP itself. 
Yet there limits to Canberra’s willingness to support and enforce the FOIP and US primacy in 
defiance of Beijing, especially if it emerges as a “hard-balancing” or “containment” mechanism. 
It is well known that not only is the PRC by far Australia’s biggest trading partner, upon whom 
continued prosperity is assumed to depend, but the possibility that the US may gradually 
withdraw from the region and leave China as regional hegemon also raise the “shadow of the 
future” in Australian calculations.29  Indeed, the current US Administration has sent mixed signals 
as to its engagement with the region.  On the one hand Trump’s disparagement of allies, trade 
disruptions, withdrawal from TPP, and disregard for the liberal international order have seriously 
undercut Australia’s position.  Yet, more recent championship of the FOIP combined with 
determined efforts to push back against Chinese challenges are more positive signals, welcomed 
in Canberra. Nevertheless, Medcalf argues “Australia’s preference is for a U.S. response to China 
that competes rather than confronts, that deters rather than provokes.”30
Economic Drivers
To be effective and appealing to regional interlocutor states across the Indo-pacific, and to 
compete with the economic challenges raised by China, Australia’s de facto participation in 
the FOIP also has a strong economic component. Given the maritime/security emphasis that 
the FOIP has acquired, it is important to note the economic aspects in which Australia is a 
participant, seeking to tap into emerging markets and benefit from the “blue water economy” 
concept.31  Integral to the FOIP vision is the desire to promote increased regional connectivity 
through free-market, transparent and high-quality programs that will meet the region’s growing 
infrastructure needs.  In this respect it again runs counter to Chinese methods that have been 
criticized for being opaque, corrupt, bringing few local employment benefits, and entrapping aid 
beneficiaries with unsustainable debt for projects of questionable viability (“debt-trap diplomacy”). 
The antithesis of the FOIP.
Australia’s economic centre of gravity has shifted over the past two decades towards its 
Western Indian-Ocean-facing and Northern coasts as result of its massive minerals exports trade 
Australia itself is a major trading partner with South East Asia, the Pacific Island Countries (PICS), 
28  Tang Siew Mun (et al.), The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak 
Institute, 2019).
29  Hugh White, Without America: Australia in the New Asia (Carlton: Black Inc., 2017).
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The National Bureau of Asian Research, May 21, 2019. https://www.nbr.org/publication/toward-a-
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and seeks to expand its opportunities with India (as detailed in the recent Varghese report). 32 
Ideally, the FOIP would have also included the economic showpiece of the TPP, but since 
the US withdrawal this has left a gaping hole in US geo-economic influence that has yet to be 
convincingly filled.  That Australia along with Japan has championed the CPTTP in the absence 
of Washington’s leadership testifies to the importance these secondary powers ascribe to the 
economic dimension of regional order.  On a smaller scale, Australia has joined its TSD partners 
in a Trilateral Investment Fund ($133mill.) designed to offer economic assistance with pressing 
regional infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific.
In terms of development, Australia is taking a prominent role, with high levels of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) targeted towards South East Asia (especially Indonesia) 
and the PICS.  Though Australia provides some assistance to Africa and other Indian Ocean 
Rim countries the locus is clearly in these two former regions of key strategic importance to 
Canberra. Indeed, the Pacific Islands may be the best example of the FOIP in action for Australia 
as part of its contiguous Pacific “Step-up.”33 A new Office of the Pacific has been established 
in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), to coordinate the promotion of good 
governance, development, and maritime capacity-building (such as the provision of patrol boats), 
with a $2bill. AUD now allocated to an infrastructure financing facility.34 To this purpose, Australia 
has also partnered with the US and others to build an electrical grid for PNG.35 The Step-Up 
policy is strategic as much as economic, as it seeks to counterbalance the massive increase of 
Chinese economic influence in the region which threatens to render such states as vulnerable to 
untoward political influence. Australian strategists are concerned that if China provides critical 
infrastructure to these countries, they will be vulnerable to subversion or subjection by Beijing 
(with the bugging of the Organisation of African Unity by China being a case in point). Australia 
is worried that if economically and financially unviable commitments are entered into with China, 
Canberra will be left to deal with the socio-economic and security fall-out of these fragile states on 
its doorstep.  
Time for Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific 
In sum, it is clear that there is ample space and demand for complementary middle powers, such 
as Canada and Australia, to assist―and in some cases provide like-minded alternatives―to US 
influence and assistance in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout our discussions with US stakeholders, it 
was also made clear that the US not only welcomes this engagement but also expects it. Indeed, 
the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report highlights how allies such as Canada and Australia can “play a 
critical role in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.”36 In light of growing US uncertainty and 
credibility in the region, and rising Chinese assertiveness―the role of Canada and Australia can 
help underscore the rules-based order and bolster the need for sustainable investment and open 
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Navigating from Potential to Delivery (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). 
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trade. This discussion of the ways in which Australia and Canada have sought to respond to the 
FOIP vision, as championed by Japan and the US, is indicative of the actual and potential role 
such that self-styled middle powers can play in upholding the regional international order against 
revisionist challenges, by doing their part.  
Yet, as middle powers with relatively limited capabilities compared with leading FOIP states 
such as the US and Japan, it may be worth Ottawa and Canberra engaging in renewed bilateral 
cooperation to explore how they can jointly coordinate their approach to the FOIP and perhaps 
pool their capabilities more effectively as they have done so successfully in the past, in initiatives 
such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and through other 
areas including disrupting people smuggling and organized crime in SEA. Potentially fruitful 
avenues of joint cooperation to explore could include HADR, joint naval exercises, MDA and 
ODA/capacity-building, among others. In conclusion, this is a prime opportunity for solidarity 
between these two middle powers to leverage their joint reputation for multilateralism, norm 
entrepreneurship and all-round reputation for “good international citizenship” to play a larger role 
in the Indo-Pacific affairs. 
